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On Mutual Recognition. Hegel versus Habermas and Apel. 
 
Abstract: 
This paper aims at clarifying the similarities and differences 
between Hegel and Habermas/Apel in relation to the topic of mutual 
recognition. Hegel’s dialectic of master and slave in his 
Phenomenology of Spirit forms the point of departure. This version 
of Hegel’s dialectic of recognition will be compared to Habermas’ 
and Apel’s discourse ethics. Habermas’/Apel’s linguistic and 
communicative turn represents one of the main differences in this 
regard, and will be compared to the abstractive type of recognition 
that is to be found in Hegel’s Phenomenology version of this topic. 
The idea of mutual recognition is, nevertheless, at hand in both 
positions, and worth taking a closer look at. 
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Hegel’s master-slave dialectic 
Central to Hegel’s master-slave dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit1 stands 
the idea that mutual recognition works as a necessary condition for the freedom 
of the individual. One-sided recognition of the freedom of the other is therefore 
not sufficient, since the individuals need to recognize each other as free 
individuals at a mutual basis in order to acquire freedom themselves. This idea 
of mutuality, in fact, is also central to other, liberal philosophers of the 1900th 
century, such as John Stuart Mill: 
 
The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our 
own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive 




Hegel’s master-slave dialectic is very useful in this respect, since it also 
contains a social type of conflict that makes it easier to see the idea of mutual 
recognition in relation to material (socio-economic) conditions. The 
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 Henceforth, I will make use of the abbreviation Phenomenology. 
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Phenomenology-version of this dialectic, however, is also one of the most 
abstractive ones within his authorship, and the master-slave dialectic as such 
bears no clear indications of which era it belongs to. In spite of its abstractive 
character, it does present the conditions of individual freedom in a clear cut 
manner. I will, therefore, briefly recapitulate the basic tenets of this master-slave 
dialectic before I turn to its function in relation to possible socio-economic 
contexts, both in relation to its generic background as well as contexts of 
application. 
 The Phenomenology-chapter of Self-Consciousness takes its departure 
in the relationship between the individual (the ‘consciousness’ in Hegel’s terms) 
and nature. This relationship forms the basis of the consciousness’ awareness 
of itself as a self-consciousness, since it is only in relation to an other that the 
consciousness can gain awareness of itself. This relationship, however, is also 
seen as an one-sided one: ‘nature’ is neither capable of gaining consciousness 
about itself nor its ‘other’. Only in relation to another consciousness will the self-
consciousness be able to acquire a relationship based on mutuality. 
 The relationship between the two self-consciousnesses is at first a 
relationship based on struggle. The self-consciousness tries to win its freedom 
through the suppression of an other self-consciousness. The first 
consciousness, winning this battle, becomes the master of the other one. The 
other, who succumbs out of fear of death, becomes the slave. The master, 
apparently, wins his freedom through this battle. The slave is forced to work for 
the master and to recognize the master as the master of this relationship. The 
slave acquires an immediate relationship to nature through his work. The 
master only indirectly relates to nature by enjoying the fruits of the slave’s work. 
 The slave’s immediate relationship to nature makes the master 
dependent of the slave. The master-slave relationship is therefore caught in 
ambiguities whereby the master turns out to be the slave of the slave and vice 
versa. The slave’s mastery of nature in fact carries the potentials for freedom 
along with the slave’s willingness to risk his own life to acquire freedom.  
However, both the master and the slave come to an awareness of the fact that 
they must recognize one another as free on a mutual basis in order to acquire 
freedom themseves. The master-slave dialectic ends at this point without 
finding any practical solutions to the problem. It, hence, remains unclear 
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whether the socio-economic positions of the master and slave are in need of 
being changed. It seems reasonable to think that in order to acquire mutual 
recognition (of each other’s freedom), one either needs to change the social 
order radically, or that some minimal kind of social change will result from the 
master’s and slave’s recognition of each other. Such ambiguities have been the 
source of interpretational pluralism as well as different usages (applications) of 
the master-slave model. Let me, therefore, start with the Left-Hegelian and 
Marxist interpretations of this model: 
 Alexandre Kojève’s interpretation of the master-slave dialectic may serve 
as the examplary case of a Marxist reading of this chapter, since the work of the 
slave is seen as central to this chapter, both in terms of defining the relationship 
between the two adversaries, as well as being the very driving force of the 
slave’s emancipation. The master and slave, furthermore, are seen as 
representatives of the proletariat and bourgeoisie, and Kojève interprets the 
master-slave dialectic as the evolution of historical types of conflict, on the basis 
of historical progress of the category of ‘work’. ‘Work’, taken literally in this 
respect, even provides the slave with the tools for his emancipation, from the 
axe to the machine gun (Kojève 1980, 51). Herbert Marcuse’s interpretation is 
more idealist and Left-Hegelian in the sense that it is based on the assumption 
that the chapter presents a reflexive process that brings the consciousness to 
an awareness of the historical and contextual basis of freedom. Freedom, 
however, is neither brought into reality in this part of the chapter, nor in the 
subsequent parts on the stoic and sceptic self-consciousnesses, since these 
represent subjective forms of freedom that appears in the form of thinking alone 
(Marcuse 1986, 114-120, esp.). 
A historical form of thinking is apparently at stake in the beginning of the 
chapter of Self-Consciousness, in the form of an awareness of the ‘I’ that is a 
‘We’ (Hegel 1980 [1807], 110-111). Here, Hegel introduces the concept of 
‘Spirit’, that seems to link the topic of self-consciouness to the more concrete 
forms of historical periods that are presented in the later chapter of Spirit.2 The 
concept of Spirit, however, is not specified in any direction at this point. To what 
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 Otto Pöggeler, in fact, interprets the Phenomenology in the sense that the relationship between the 
chapters of Self-Consciousness and Spirit constitutes the main theme of the work. The abstractive topic 
of mutual recognition in Self-Consciousness is recapitulated in the form of historical relations of 
recognition in Spirit. Cf., (Pöggeler 1993, 231-257 & 264-265, esp.). 
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extent the master-slave dialectic of the chaper of Self-Consciousness, then, 
opens up for specific historical interpretations, both in relation to the chapter of 
Spirit as well as to historical contexts apart from this chapter, remains an open 
question. The abstract categories of ‘master’, ‘slave’ and ‘work’ do not, per se, 
point in any specific directions in this respect. The chapter, in fact, seems to 
present the ‘struggle for recognition’ in an abstractive and ahistorical sense that 
turns the theme into an ideal typical form of struggle that could be applied to 
any historical era. 
These last remarks, in fact, is the reason why philosophers like Nicolai 
Hartmann and Hans-Georg Gadamer have been seeing the ‘master-slave’-
struggle as an ideal-typical model. On the one hand, this struggle shows the 
general characteristics of any kind of struggle for recognition. On the other 
hand, it also shows the conditions for indiviual freedom in terms of mutual 
recognition. In the master-slave struggle, Hartmann sees the expression of an 
eternal, sociological kind of law that is at core of any relationship between 
master and servant: 
 
Es ist ein ewiges Gesetz im Wesen des Herrschers und Dieners, das 
Hegel hier herausarbeitet, ein – wenn man so will – ein soziologisches 
Grundgesetz. (Hartmann 1974, 333)  
 
Gadamer has, in a similar manner, been stressing the universality and ideal 
typicality of the master-slave model. On the one hand, he criticizes Marxist 
interpretations for too quickly interpreting the model in terms of a modern class 
struggle. The struggle Hegel’s text is referring to, he says, is more likely to be 
based on feudal structures of domination and subordinance than on capitalist 
ones. The category of ‘work’, then, is more likely to apply to the work of the 
peasant and the handiworker. The products of the work, hence, may be the 
fruits of the work with the soil as well as the artifacts of the handiworker 
(Gadamer 1976, 65). Nevertheless, by seeing this model as an ideal model, one 
may well apply it to any context involving domination and subordinance. Even if 
Hegel were not speaking of capitalist class struggles, the model may well be 
applied to these struggles, or to other struggles appearing in our times. 
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Discourse ethics and mutual recognition 
The condition of mutual recognition assumes a quite different function in 
discourse ethics, since it here works as a condition for mutual understanding 
and consensus. Both Habermas and Apel turn to Hegel in their formulations of 
mutual recognition. In his paper ‘Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel’s Critique 
of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?’, Habermas speaks of the symmetry and 
reciprocity conditions of practical discourses: the participants are supposed to 
take into consideration the arguments of one another on a mutual basis 
(Habermas 1990 [1986], 201) 3. Apel does, in a similar manner, speak of the 
‘equal right to take part’ in a discourse and the ‘co-responsibility of the members 
of a discourse’, cf., (Apel 1999, 48) as well as (Apel 1996, 23). The term 
‘discourse’, hence, as used by these two philosophers, may be defined as a 
dialogue on equal terms. (For convenience purposes, I am also going to adhere 
to the term ‘discourse proper’.) 
 Although the differences between these two philosophers do not form the 
main theme in this context, there is one specific difference that is worth taking 
into consideration. Habermas presupposes that the preconditions of symmetry 
and reciprocity are part of everyday life and ordinary communicative practices. 
They are at work in a counterfactual manner: whenever we aim at reaching an 
agreement on a subject matter with another person, we do have to take the 
arguments of one another into consideration in a truthful, rational manner. His 
discourse theory, therefore, aims at reconstructing the conditions of valid 
consensus on basis of these practices and by reformulating them in terms of 
ideal conditions. Apel does agree with Habermas on this point, but sharpens the 
cleavage between the ideal and the real status of these conditions, i.e., the 
symmetry and reciprocity conditions seen as purely ideal conditions on the one 
hand, and these conditions as part of empirical communicative practices on the 
other. He claims that we cannot, in any a priori like way, presuppose that these 
conditions are operable in any communication community that is aiming towards 
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 This paper (with the Ger. title: ‘Treffen Hegels Einvände gegen Kant auch die Diskursethik zu?’) first 
appeared  in 1986, in: Kuhlmann, W. (ed.), Moralität und Sittlichkeit. Das Problem Hegels und die 
Diskursethik (Suhrkamp, 1986). It was not part of the original edition of Moralbewuβtsein und 
kommunikatives Handeln (Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp 1983), but was added to Polity Press’ English 
translation of this work (Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Cambridge/Massachusetts, 
Polity Press, 1990).  
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mutual agreement. Communicative practices are, after all, capable of being 
corrupted in various ways: by both power structures and economical differences 
and by uses of rhetorical and manipulative means. Apel, therefore, turns to both 
Kant and Hegel in this regard. He uses the Kantian divide between “regulative 
ideas” and empirical facts, and says that in this sense, one must presuppose 
such a divide between the regulative status of the consensual conditions and 
the empirical level of communication. Contrary to Hegel, one cannot expect a 
perfect reconciliation between ‘ought’ and ‘is’. One cannot, hence, expect a full-
scale fulfilment of the argumentative conditions within real communication 
communities: 
 
Freilich hat die soeben skizzierte Grundnorm (=Metanorm) einer 
Ethik der Konsensbildung selbst nur den Charakter einer 
“regulativen Idee”, der – nach Kant – “nichts Empirisches völlig 
korrespondieren kann”, d.h. sie kann im Prinzip niemals mit dem 
konkreten Begreifen der substantiellen Sittlichkeit im Sinne Hegels 
gleichgesetzt werden; denn wir werden niemals in einer Welt leben, 
in der die totale Vermittlung von Sein und Sollen – im Sinne Hegels: 
die Versöhnung der Idee mit sich selbst – Wirklichkeit ist. (Apel 
1988, 101) 
 
Useful, therefore, is the divide between understanding oriented and success 
oriented forms of communication that is at hand in both Habermas’ and Apel’s 
positions. Discourses proper depend on the understanding oriented type of 
communication if a valid type of understanding and consensus is to come 
through. Arguments are supposed to be carried out in a rational manner, for the 
sake of ‘the subject matter at hand’ (Ger. die Sache selbst) only. Strategic forms 
of communication that are tied to hidden agendas and/or the usage of power 
claims cannot, therefore, be part of a discourse proper. Discourses, hence, 
depend on a communicative form of rationality that carries an inherent 
orientation towards mutual understanding. This communicative rationality is 
counterpoised to strategic kinds of rationality that rely on hidden agendas or are 
tied to interests that are not part of the discursive argumentation.4 In Habermas’ 
                                                          
4
 Apel makes a distinction between open strategic speech acts (such as threats and intimidations) vs. 
concealed ones (such as lies and deceptions).Cf., esp., (Apel 1999 [1994]) on this point. Note that (Apel 
1999 [1994]) is a translation of (Apel 1998b). Cf., also, (Apel 1996). 
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terms, strategic types of communication are likely to be oriented towards 
success rather than understanding (cf. Habermas 1997, 286-290, esp.). 
 However, the divide between strategic and communicative types of 
rationality also provides Habermas’ position with a critical potential, since the 
presence of strategic communicative acts within a discursive setting indicates 
that the argumentative conditions of the discourse proper are violated. This 
divide, then, can be used for critical purposes in order to improve the 
argumentative process of a discourse. Habermas’ divide between the ‘ideal 
discourse’ and ‘real discourse’ is useful in this regard, since the ‘ideal discourse’ 
points to the ideal argumentation conditions of the discourse, while the ‘real 
discourse’ is used about the empirically given discourse. Apel does, similarly, 
distinguish between the ideal community of communication and the real 
community/communities of communication. 
 Bringing back Hartmann’s and Gadamer’s ‘ideal type’ interpretation of 
Hegel’s dialectic of recognition proves to be fruitful in this regard. Apel’s ideal 
community of communication may well work as a ideal typical model in this 
manner, since the ideal community can be used as a critical device in order to 
identify the shortcomings of real communities of communication. The ideal 
typical status of the conditions of ‘mutual recognition’ is of special relevance in 
relation to Apel’s ideal community of communication, since Apel sharpens the 
cleavage between the ideal and real communities of communication. In the next 
part, I will be looking closer at the differences between Hegel’s and 
Habermas’/Apel’s positions. 
  
Hegel and discourse ethics 
Discourse ethics’ linguistic and communicative transformation of ‘mutual 
recognition’ is one of the main differences between Hegel’s and 
Habermas’/Apel’s positions. Hegel’s master-slave dialectic is not based on a 
dialogic process, but is only based on an epistemic process that each of the 
consciousnesses must go through in order to know what freedom really is. This 
process of acquiring knowledge is, further on, carried out on a solitary basis 
rather than a common search for truth. The Phenomenology-version of the 
theme of mutual recognition, hence, seems to be based on a philosophy of 
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consciousness that makes use of the ‘monological’ approach of the solitary 
subject. Adding up to this, is the point that the theme is presented in abstractive 
terms that does not point in any specific, i.e., historical and contextual, 
direction.5 
 Another difference is also at stake when comparing Hegel’s version to 
Habermas’ and Apel’s. Hegel’s master and slave dialectic provides a generic 
kind of explanation of the emergence of the master and slave relation through 
the struggle for freedom through recognition. The idea of freedom through 
mutual recognition follows as consequence of this process. Discourse ethics, on 
the other hand, is not concerned with the genesis of the phenomenon of mutual 
recognition as such. Mutual recognition is rather presupposed as a non-
circumventable condition of any understanding and consensus oriented 
communication. A forced consensus cannot, after all, be considered to be a 
valid consensus. 
 The linguistic turn of Apel’s and Habermas’ positions is central in this 
regard, since the linguistic turn is part of a communicative and dialogical 
transformation of Hegel’s model of mutual recognition. Both Habermas and Apel 
have, in addition, been appropriating certain parts from speech acts theories: in 
addtition to the symmetry and reciprocity conditions, discourses in general also 
have to presuppose the ‘four validity claims’ of truth, rightness, sincerity and 
intelligibility. These are seen as unavoidable, in the sense that one cannot 
reach a valid consensus unless a truth or rightness claim has been raised by 
any of the participants: one does, after all, have to agree on something. The 
truth and rightness claims that are part of the discussion must in addition be 
intelligible to the participants. And finally, one must presuppose that the 
participants are sincere and that the truth and rightness claims are put forward 
on a sincere basis and truthful manner (cf., for instance, Apel 1994, 23, 
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 Axel Honneth contrasts the Phenomenology version of this theme to earlier versions from Hegel’s Jena 
period, where concrete forms of recognition are found on the contextual level, i.e., in the family, the 
society and the state. Honneth does, in addition, claim that Hegel’s Phenomenology represents a ‘return 
to the philosophy of consciousness’, and that the interpresonal relationships that are described in the 
earlier versions are of an intersubjective kind (Honneth 1998, 52-53).  Worth to notice is that these 
concrete forms of ‘recognition’ also are found in Hegel’s later works, like his Philosophy of Right. An 
interesting question in this regard, is whether these concrete relationships are in accordance with the 
ideal type of mutual recognition that is at stake in the Phenomenology? 
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Habermas 1972, 137-144)6. In addition, these two philosophers do also 
distinguish between practical and theoretical discourses. Habermas’ speaks of 
the two bridging principles of induction and universalisation. (Habermas 1990 
[1983]), 63, 65). Theoretical (scientific) discourses depend on an inductive 
principle, while practical discourses (moral, legal) rely on the universalisation 
principle: 
 
(U): For a norm to be valid, the consequences and side effects of its 
general observance for the satisfaction of each person’s particular 
interests must be acceptable to all. (Habermas 1990 [1986], 197) 
 
Apel’s concern is the pequliar kind of meta-normativity that is part of both 
theoretical and practical discourses. The consensual conditions of ‘symmetry 
and reciprocity’ and ‘the four validity claims’ work as meta-normative conditions 
of understanding and consensus. In addition, he does not draw any sharp line 
between theoretical and practical discourses, since scientific decisions may 
involve practical problems of moral and legal kinds. Rightness claims in the 
form of disputable norms may be part of scientific discourses as well. In Apel’s 
terms: a switch from a theoretical to a practical discourse is in such cases 
needed (Apel 1999, 58-59). What is important in this context, are the 
intersubjective conditions that are part of this conception. 
 The model that Apel works out, is a subject-cosubject-object-model of 
discourse ethics and discourse theory7. The subject - cosubject - relationship 
(Subjekt-Kosubjekt) and the subject-object-relationship work as complementary 
relations within this model. The subject - cosubject - relationship has been given 
priority within Apel’s thinking, and with it also the criterion of consensus. Claims 
to truth, as well as claims to rightness, can only be vindicated within a subject-
cosubject-model, and thereby “truth” can never be conceived from the solitary 
individual’s point of view (cf., Apel 1994, 26, Apel 1999, 45-46).  
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 In (Habermas 1972), Habermas refers to all these four claims, and the first validity claim, intelligibility, 
is formulated in a more extended manner than within his later accounts. In (Habermas 1997, 278, 307), 
Habermas only refers to the three claims of truth, rightness and truthfulness/sincerity, even if it seems 
reasonable to think of ‘intelligibilty’ as a precondition of the other three claims, since claims to truth, 
rightness as well as sincerity need to be understandable to the hearer. 
7
 Habermas has been adhering to the term ‘discourse theory’ in his later works since 1992, and this term 
is supposed to comprise both practical and theoretical discourses. The terms ‘discourse ethics’ and 
‘discourse theory’ do for the main time, in his earlier works and also in Apel’s works, refer to the 
different realms of practical and theoretical discourses, respectively. 
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 The differences between moral discourses and legal/political discourses 
are acknowledged by both Habermas and Apel. These differences are of 
interest in this respect, since moral discourses are based on interpersonal 
relations on a face-to-face basis while political discourses are based on 
representation rather than participation.8 The possibility of taking part oneself is 
important in this respect, since it affects the person’s possibility of influencing 
the decisions made. The principle of ‘U’ does, after all, state that ‘the 
consequences and side effects of the norms general observance for the 
satisfaction of each person’s particular interests must be acceptable to all’. 
Other differences between the moral and politica/legal realm are also of 
relevance, since legal rules are based on the state’s power monopoly vis-a-vis 
its citizens. In addition, legal rules are supposed to be based on generalizable 
interests that result from political decision making processes, and not the 
particular interests of each and every person. Habermas has therefore seen the 
need to formulate a more general version of the universalisation principle, the 
socalled ‘discourse principle’ of (D) that on a more general basis states that 
norms need to be in accordance with the interests of affected persons:  
 
(D): Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected 
persons could agree as participants in rational discourses. 
(Habermas 1996 [1992], 107) 
 
Note that the principle of (D) states that the possibly affected persons in 
principle should be given the possibility to take part in a rational discourse. This 
formulation of the principle is, therefore, in accordance with the democratic type 
of discourse. The possibility of taking part oneself in moral discourses, on the 
other hand, is the reason why Apel thinks of the moral discourse as the one that 
is most closely to the ideal conditions of the discourse (cf., Apel 2002, esp.)9. 
The moral discourse, then, can be said to work closely to the ideal type of 
‘mutual recognition’. Other discourses, like those of the political and legal kind, 
only approximate the conditions to fuller or lesser degrees. Habermas, on the 
other hand, does not provide the moral type of discourses with any primordial 
function: in Faktizität und Geltung he works out a differentiated model that takes 
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 On this point, cf., also, (Cortina 1993). 
9
 The difference between the two principles of (D) and (U) is also at stake in (Hedberg 2011, 53-57, esp.). 
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into consideration the differences between moral and political/legal discourses 
(cf., Habermas 1996 [1992], 118-131, esp.). The disagreements between these 
two philosophers in this regard, have been concerning both the status of the 
ideal discourse in relation to real discourses, as well as the status of moral 
discourses in relation to other practical discourses (cf., (Apel 1998c) as well as 
(Habermas 2003).). 
Within discourse ethics/discourse theory, the idea of mutual recognition 
is foremost based on the communicative approach to understanding and 
consensus. Mutual recognition, then, works as a condition for valid consensus, 
and is based on the equal right to take part in a discourse and the duty to take 
the arguments of each other into consideration on an equal basis. The idea of 
‘equal rights’, then, seems to be central to discourse ethics. Taking into 
consideration the function of mutual recognition as condition for freedom in 
Hegel’s version, the folllowing question remains:  
What, then, is freedom, based on Apel and Habermas approach to 
mutual recognition?  
 
Freedom: communicative and contextual 
In Faktizität und Geltung, Habermas turns to communicative freedom in relation 
to civil rights (Ger. Freiheits- und Teilnahmerechte) that are part of constitutional 
democracies. Here, he says that:  
 
Communicative freedom exists only between actors who, adopting 
a performative attitude, want to reach an understanding with one 
another about something and expect one another to take positions 
on reciprocally raised validity claims. (Habermas 1996 [1992], 119) 
 
The relationship between communicative freedom and civil rights is of interest in 
this regard, since civil, democratic, rights contain specific forms of individual 
liberties and in this sense work as more contextualised versions of ‘freedom’. 
The communicative form of freedom is also a part of democratic rights, since 
formal rights like the freedom of speech and freedom to vote and take part in 
voluntary associations depend on communicative freedom. These rights are 
also based on the individuals’ respect for the rights of one another through their 
respect for the law. 
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 What, then, about material rights in relation to formal rights, such as 
freedom of speech and freedom of conscience? By taking into consideration the 
Left-Hegelian interpretations of Hegel, material rights may assume an important 
function in this sense, since socio-economic differences may affect the 
possibility of taking part in political processes. This is especially so in cases of 
grave differences between different strata of the population. Securing some 
minimal levels of living, then, seems to be vital for political part-taking. 
 In Faktizität und Geltung, Habermas works out a list of 5 basic rights that 
include both formal and material rights. Here, the ‘political autonomy of the 
citizen’, the ‘equal right to take part in political processes and associations’, and 
the ‘legal protection of the individual’ work as basic premises.10 These first three 
rights, however, are supplemented by two extended rights that stress the legal 
and also the socio-economic basis of these rights. Their constitutional basis is 
secured by being part of legitimate law. These rights are also being connected 
to social and ecological life-conditions that secure the equal opportunities of 
citizens. The last of these rights, clearly, represents a material type of basic 
rights.  
 May, ‘freedom’ in this sense both be interpreted as a freedom of 
opportunity (equal right to take part) as well as a distributive form of justice? 
This seems to be the case in Habermas’ version of it. Habermas does, 
however, aslo claim that ideas of distributive justice are part of a discursive 
process. In Torben Hviid-Nielsen’s interview with Habermas in Justification and 
Application11, Habermas turns to the discussion of distributive versus ‘equal 
rights’ types of justice (Habermas 1993, 152). Here, it seems clear that 
questions concerning different ideas of justice are left to real discourses to 
decide.   
 Are, then, material rights to be subordinated to the decisions made by 
discourses adhering to communicative freedom? This seems to be the answer 
provided for by Habermas. One may, nevertheless, think of material rights as an 
important part of the conditions of political freedom. Securing some minimal 
income level can be vital for political participation. Apel, therefore, think it is 
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 For the complete list of these basic rights categories, see (Habermas 1996 [1992], 122-123).  
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 This interview is added to the English translation of the work. Worth to notice is that this English 
translation only contains the first three chapters of the original work.  
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important to work for improved conditions also at an international level. In 
Globalization and the Need for Universal Ethics, he says that: 
 
Conceived of more radically, the regulative principle of striving for 
unrestricted consensus must even be capable of initiating and 
regulating a change of the political conditions of consensus-
formation towards taking into account the interests of all affected 
parties, for example, the interests and possible arguments of the 
poor in the Third World who, up to now, to a large part have been 
excluded from all politically and economically relevant dialogues 
about their situation. (Apel 2000, 152)  
 
This means that the conditions of ‘symmetry and reciprocity’ can be applied to 
both small-scale and large-scale groups in order to identify possible obstacles 
to the argumentative form of freedom. 
 
 
‘Freedom and equality’. Concluding remarks 
Central to Left-Hegelian and Marxist interpretations of Hegel’s master and slave 
dialectic stands the idea that freedom cannot be achieved without socio-
economic type of equality. In the Marxist version, equality equals to ‘equality in 
result’ rather than ‘equality in process’. Ideally seen, then, the master and slave 
dialectic should lead to socio-economic changes as well, making the slave and 
master equal to another also in relation to ‘work’ and ‘nature’. 
 In Habermas’ (and Apel’s) version, freedom is foremost interpreted in 
terms of ‘equal rights’. However, the issue of distributive justice makes clear 
that material conditions may work contrary to equal rights. ‘Equal rights’ are not 
always equal to ‘equal opportunities’. Discourse ethics, hence, takes into 
consideration the two-way problem that is involved in the democratic form of 
equal rights. On the one hand, democatic discourses cannot be tied to the 
income and welfare levels of its participants. On the other hand, social welfare 
policies may influence the population’s political participation, especially in times 
of economic crisis. 





Universalist moralities are dependent on forms of life that are rationalized 
in that they make possible the prudent application of universal moral 
insights and support motivations for translating insights into moral action. 
Only those forms of life that meet universalist moralities halfway in this 
sense fulfill the conditions necessary to reverse the abstractive 
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